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SUMMARY
Sudan, geographically the largest country
in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war inter-
mittently for 4 decades.  An estimated 2 mil-
lion people have died over the past two de-
cades due to war-related causes and famine,
and millions have been displaced from their
homes.
The relief operation in southern Sudan is
being coordinated by Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS), established in 1989 in response
to the 1988 humanitarian crisis in which over
200,000 people died of starvation.  The OLS,
a consortium of U.N. agencies and three dozen
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
operates in both government and rebel-con-
trolled territories.  
The 21-year civil war has been and con-
tinues to be a major contributing factor to
recurring humanitarian crisis.  There have
been many failed attempts to end the civil war
in southern Sudan, including efforts by Nige-
ria, Kenya, Ethiopia, former President Jimmy
Carter, and the United States.  To that end, the
heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya,
and Uganda formed a mediation committee
under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental
Authority for Development (IGAD) and held
the first formal negotiations in March 1994. 
In July 2002, the Sudan government and
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
signed a peace framework agreement in
Kenya.  In early September, the government of
Sudan walked out of the Machakos talks and
returned under pressure in early October 2002.
On May 26, 2004, the Government of Sudan
and SPLA signed three protocols on Power
Sharing, the Nuba Mountains and Southern
Blue Nile, and on the long disputed Abyei
area.  The signing of these protocols resolved
all outstanding issues between the parties,
although the parties must still negotiate and
agree on a comprehensive cease-fire and
modalities for implementation.  On June 5,
2004, the parties signed “the Nairobi Declara-
tion on the Final Phase of Peace in the Su-
dan.”
Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Darfur
in western Sudan has led to a major humanita-
rian disaster, with an estimated 1.2 million
people displaced and more that 200,000 peo-
ple forced into neighboring Chad.  While there
are no reliable estimates of the number of
people killed as a result of the conflict, some
observers project that up to 50,000 people
have been killed over the past 18 months.
U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) officials assert that an estimated
320,000 could die by the end of 2004, irre-
spective of the international response.  In July
2004, the House and Senate declared the
atrocities in Darfur genocide, and the Bush
Administration reached the same conclusion
in September 2004.
Relations between the United States and
Sudan are poor in part because of Khartoum’s
human rights violations, its war policy in the
south, and its support for international terror-
ism, although in recent months relations have
improved somewhat.  In November 1997, the
Clinton Administration imposed comprehen-
sive sanctions on the NIF government.  Presi-
dent Bush has renewed the sanctions since he




In September 2004, the Bush Administration declared the atrocities in Darfur genocide.
In a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Powell
stated that “genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and
the Janjaweed bear responsibility — and that genocide may still be occurring.”  Meanwhile,
the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1564, threatening sanctions against
the Government of Sudan (see below for more on 1564).  
In mid-September, negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Nigeria under
the chairmanship of  President Obasanjo ended without much progress.  Negotiations are
expected to resume in late October 2004.  Moreover, talks between the SPLA and the
Government of Sudan are expected to resume in early October 2004. 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In 1956, Sudan became the first independent (from Britain and Egypt) country in sub-
Saharan Africa.  For almost 4 decades, the east African country with a population of 35
million people has been the scene of intermittent conflict.  An estimated two million people
have died over the past two decades from war-related causes and famine in southern Sudan,
and millions more have been displaced.  The Sudanese conflict, Africa’s longest-running
civil war, shows no sign of ending.  The sources of the conflict are deeper and more
complicated than the claims of political leaders and some observers.  Religion is a major
factor because of the Islamic fundamentalist agenda of the current government, dominated
by the mostly Muslim/Arab north.  Southerners, who are Christian and animist, reject the
Islamization of the country and favor a secular arrangement.  Social and economic disparities
are also major contributing factors to the Sudanese conflict.
The abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement in 1983, which ended the first
phase of the civil war in the south, by former President Jaffer Nimeri is considered a major
triggering factor in the current civil war.  Although the National Islamic Front government,
which ousted the democratically elected civilian government in 1989, has pursued the war
in southern Sudan with vigor, previous governments, both civilian and military, had rejected
southern demands for autonomy and equality.  Northern political leaders for decades treated
southerners as second-class citizens and did not see the south as an integral part of the
country.  Southern political leaders argue that under successive civilian and military
governments, political elites in the north have made only superficial attempts to address the
grievances of the south without compromising the north’s dominant economic, political, and
social status. In recent years, most political leaders in the north, now in opposition to the
current government, say that mistakes were made and that they are prepared to correct them.
But the political mood among southerners has sharply shifted in favor of separation from the
north.  The current government seems determined to pursue the military option.  Economic
conditions have deteriorated significantly, and millions of southern Sudanese are at risk of
starvation due to a serious humanitarian crisis, partly caused by the government’s decision




Overview. The crisis in Darfur State in western Sudan has raised serious concerns
about a major humanitarian disaster, with an estimated one million people displaced and
more than 100,000 people forced into neighboring Chad.  There are no reliable estimates of
the number of people killed as a result of the conflict.  The government of Sudan has denied
or severely restricted access to relief officials in Darfur.  Some observers and U.S. officials
estimate that between 10,000-30,000 people have been killed over the past twelve months.
The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged to challenge
the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur.  The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claim that the government of Sudan
discriminates against the Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur.  The government of Sudan
dismisses the SLA and JEM as terrorists.  The conflict pits the three African ethnic groups,
the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit, against the nomadic Arab ethnic groups.  Tension between
the largely African-Muslim ethnic groups and the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced
to the 1930s and most recently in the 1980s.  Successive governments in Khartoum have long
neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur and did very little to prevent or contain attacks
by Arab militias against non-Arabs in Darfur.  Non-Arab groups took up arms against
successive central governments in Khartoum, albeit unsuccessfully.  In the early 1990s, the
NIF government, which came to power in 1989, began to arm Arab militias and disarm the
largely African ethnic groups. 
The Current Crisis.  At the core of this conflict is a struggle for control of resources.
The largely nomadic Arab ethnic groups often venture into the traditionally farming
communities of Darfur for water and grazing, often triggering armed conflict between the
two groups.  Darfur is home to an estimated 7 million people and has more than 30 ethnic
groups, although these groups fall into two major categories: African and Arab.  Both
communities are Muslim, and years of intermarriages have made racial distinction
impossible.  Fighting over resources is one of several factors that has led to intense infighting
in Darfur over the years.  The NIF government systematically and deliberately pursued a
policy of discrimination and marginalization of the African communities in Darfur and gave
support to the Arab militia to suppress non-Arabs, whom it considered a threat to its hold on
power.  In 2000, with the ouster of the founder of the NIF, Hassan al-Turabi, and a split
within the Islamist Movement, the government imposed a state of emergency and used its
new authority to crack down on dissidents in Darfur.  By 2002, a little-known self-defense
force of a largely Fur-dominated group emerged as the SLA, challenging government forces
in Darfur.
With the NIF regime internally in turmoil and mounting international pressure to end
the North-South conflict, the SLA and JEM were able to gain the upper hand in the initial
phase of the conflict against government forces, and appear well prepared and armed.  The
rebels also enjoyed the support of the local population as well as officers and soldiers in the
Sudanese army.  A significant number of senior officers and soldiers in the Sudanese armed
forces come from Darfur. The SLA also benefitted from outside support, including from
fellow Zaghawa in Chad and financial support from Darfur businessmen in the Persian Gulf.
The government of Sudan has also accused Eritrea and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of providing support to the SLA. The government of Sudan also
accuses the founder of the NIF, Hassan al-Turabi, of having links with JEM.  Some observers
say that Turabi, through his supporters, provides political and financial support to JEM.  In
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late March 2004, Turabi, along with a number of senior army officers, was arrested.  The
government claimed that Turabi was behind an attempted coup, although officials in
Khartoum seemed to back off from that claim by mid-April 2004. 
In mid-2003, the government of Sudan significantly increased its presence in Darfur by
arming the Arab militia, the Janjaweed, and by deploying the Popular Defense Force (PDF).
The Janjaweed, under the direction of regular government forces, reportedly unleashed a
campaign of terror against civilians.  The Arab militia engaged in what United Nations
officials described as “ethnic cleansing” of the African ethnic groups of Darfur.  Men  have
been summarily executed, women have been raped, and more than 100,000 have been forced
into exile in neighboring countries.  In early February 2004, the government launched a
major military offensive against the rebel forces, and by mid-February 2004, President Omar
Bashir, in a nationally televised speech, declared that the security forces had crushed the SLA
and JEM and offered amnesty to the rebels.  
The forceful expulsion of the mainly African ethnic groups from their homes was done
in a deliberate, sequenced, and systematic way, according to a briefing paper on the Darfur
crisis by the Office of U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan.  The
report describes the mechanisms used to cleanse the area of non-Arabs by “total
disengagement of administration and suspension of all government services.”  These include
suspending most government functions, including non-payment of salaries to government
workers, and abandoning basic government services, such as health care and law
enforcement. According to the United Nations, once government officials leave these
communities, the people in these areas are then accused of being rebel sympathizers and are
targeted by government militias.  The Janjaweed would then burn villages, loot the properties
of the non-Arabs, abduct children,  rape women, and prevent people from returning to their
homes. 
Negotiations and the Cease-Fire Agreement
In September 2003, the government of Sudan and the SLA signed a cease-fire
agreement mediated by President Idriss Deby of Chad.  The agreement collapsed in
December 2003.  In early April 2004, the government of Sudan and the SLA/JEM agreed to
a cease-fire and political dialogue to peacefully resolve the conflict.  The government of
Sudan agreed to negotiate with the rebels after considerable international pressure.  The
negotiations were conducted under the auspices of President Deby of Chad and assisted by
the African Union.  The United States and other international participants played an
important role in facilitating the negotiations, although the government of Sudan delegation
walked out of the talks in protest when the head of the U.S. delegation began to deliver his
opening remarks. 
The parties agreed to observe a cease-fire for a period of 45 days, renewable
automatically if both parties agree.  The cease-fire agreement appears to be holding, although
the government of Sudan was accused of violating the agreement.  The situation in Darfur,
however, continues to deteriorate, largely due to repeated and deliberate denial of access to
the affected areas by government officials.  Moreover, monitoring mechanisms agreed to by
the parties are yet to be implemented, and many observers fear that continued delay could
unravel the cease-fire agreement.  As part of the agreement, the African Union, with the help
of the United States and the European Union, was tasked to deploy a monitoring team in
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Darfur and establish a Joint Commission consisting of the two parties, Chad and the
international community.  American and European Union officials argue that the monitoring
team must be independent and credible.
The International Community’s Response
The international community’s response to the Darfur crisis was slow and ineffective,
in part because of the government of Sudan’s repeated refusal to allow relief workers in
Darfur. It was not until late 2003, almost one year after the crisis erupted, that some members
of the international community began to speak about gross human rights abuses and
widespread humanitarian crisis in Darfur.  According to some analysts, the Bush
Administration did not consider the Darfur crisis as a priority; instead the Administration
was largely focused on the talks between the government of Sudan and the SPLM.  The first
and only Darfur statement by the White House was issued in early April 2004, although U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) officials spoke of a growing humanitarian
crisis and visited the area in late 2003.
U.N.S.C. Resolution 1564
–  Expresses grave concern about lack of security.
–  States that GOS is responsible for the security and safety of the population.
–  Declares the situation in Sudan as a threat to international peace and security.
–  Deplores recent cease-fire violations by GOS
–  Supports the African Union’s plan to enhance and augment its monitoring mission in
    Darfur.
–  Calls on member states to provide financial and logistical support to the AU mission.
–  Threatens the GOS with sanctions, including measures targeting its petroleum sector, if it
    fails to comply with the Council’s demands.
Source: United Nations
Administration officials were concerned that forceful measures against the government
of Sudan could undermine the peace process between the GOS and the SPLM.  Some United
Nations officials, however, have been forceful in their statements and have publicly
expressed concerns about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Darfur.  The United
Nations Resident Humanitarian Coordinator consistently reported to headquarters about
gross human rights violations in Darfur.  In a letter dated March 22, 2004, to the State
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sudan, U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Mukesh Kapila wrote
that “the war in Darfur started off in a small way last year but it has progressively got worse.
A predominant feature of this is that the brunt is being borne by civilians.  This includes
vulnerable women and children ... The violence in Darfur appears to be particularly directed
at a specific group based on their ethnic identity and appears to be systemized.  Thus it is
akin to ethnic cleansing.”  The African Union and the Arab League did not make public
statements on the Darfur crisis until the signing of the cease-fire agreement.
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The Humanitarian Situation and the U.S. Response
According to United Nations and U.S. officials, the situation in Darfur is considered the
worst current humanitarian and human rights crisis in the world.  Out of a population of 7
million people, 1.2 million  are internally displaced, an estimated 200,000  are forced into
exile, and an estimated 30,000-50,000 civilian have been killed.  As of September 2004, total
U.S. government (USG) assistance for Darfur and Chad was estimated at $218 million
[http://www.usaid.gov].  USAID has also established a Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART) for Darfur, although the government of Sudan has not yet allowed the team to go
into Darfur.  The government of Sudan has refused to issue visas for the 28-member team,
although they have indicated that they might issue the visas after the U.N. delegation,
currently in Sudan, completes its mission.  The government of Sudan has harshly criticized
USAID and has accused the agency of being too sympathetic to the rebels.  Meanwhile,
humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate, in large part because of continued
government restrictions.  According to USAID, “due to GOS [government of Sudan]
impediments that block travel permits and relief operations in Darfur, humanitarian access
to vulnerable populations outside of the state capitals of Geneina, Al-Fashir, and Nyala is
extremely limited, and access to many areas is completely denied.” And according to Doctors
Without Borders, “because of the lack of appropriate, urgently needed aid, the health of
displaced people in Sudan’s Darfur region, particularly children, is radically worsening.”
Humanitarian Situation at a Glance
–  Affected Population: 2.2 million.
–  IDPs: 1.2 million.
–  Refugees: 200,000
–  Deaths: 50,000 (as of September 2004).
–  U.S. Assistance: $218 Million as of September 2004.
Source: USAID
Peace Talks
Peace efforts to end the civil war in Sudan have not succeeded in part because of
irreconcilable differences on fundamental issues between the “Arabized” north and southern
rebels. The strong belief by the NIF regime that it could resolve the conflict through military
means has been and continues to be a major impediment to peaceful efforts.  Another major
obstacle is NIF’s inflexible position on the role of religion in politics and government.  The
government seems to show interest in talks when it is weakened militarily or to buy time to
prepare for another military offensive.
The IGAD Peace Process
Alarmed by the deepening crisis and multiple failed attempts by outside mediators,
members of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional
organization that promotes cooperation and development, formed a mediation committee
consisting of two organs: a summit committee of heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya
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and Uganda, and a standing committee composed of their mediators.  Preliminary talks were
held in November 1993 and January 1994, and formal negotiations began in March and May
of the same year. Presented at the May meeting, the Declaration of Principles (DOP)
included the following provisions: the right of self-determination with national unity as a
high priority, separation of religion and state (secularism), a system of governance based on
multiparty democracy, decentralization through a loose federation or a confederacy, respect
for human rights and a referendum to be held in the south with secession as an option. The
NIF government initially resisted the DOP, particularly self-determination and secularism.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) accepted the DOP and the government
was later persuaded by the mediators to accept the DOP.  
The IGAD peace process began with the view that the Sudan conflict was having
serious repercussions not only in the country but also in the region, and sought to deal with
the root causes of the conflict.  Conditions were ripe for talks since both sides were
exhausted from years of fighting and some members of the IGAD committee were seen by
Khartoum as allies.  In 1994, however, relations between IGAD member Eritrea and Sudan
began to deteriorate largely due to Sudan’s support for an Eritrean opposition group, the
Eritrea Islamic Jihad.  Meanwhile, serious opposition to the DOP began to emerge from the
NIF government.  The most contentious issues were secularism and self-determination,
which the Khartoum government refused to concede.  In July 1994, the polarization of the
two sides intensified after the Khartoum government appointed a hard-line NIF member to
its delegation.
The Khartoum delegation professed the government’s commitment to Islamic law as
part of a religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Sudan and throughout the
continent, and refused self-determination as a ploy to split the country.  In September of
2002,  Kenya’s President at the time, Daniel T. Arap Moi, convened a meeting of the
committee’s heads of state, Sudan’s President al-Bashir and the leader of SPLA.  The
Khartoum government walked out of these peace talks, rejecting the DOP. Loss of military
ground and intense international pressure forced the government to the negotiating table in
Nairobi in 1997 and formally accepted the DOP.  The return to the IGAD process was, in
part, in recognition of its failed effort to attract other mediators, who might have been more
supportive of NIF positions. 
Further meetings in 1997-1998 sought to narrow  divisions between the two sides with
the government of Sudan formally agreeing to self-determination for the south.  The
government of Sudan also appeared willing to compromise on some other issues.  In May
1998, the parties, despite some progress earlier, disagreed on which territories were
considered part of the south.  The Khartoum delegation defined the south as the three
provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, established at independence in
January 1956.  The SPLM/A argued that Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile and
other areas on the margins of the three core provinces were also part of the south.  There
were also serious disagreements on the duration of the interim period before a referendum
on self determination, and issues relating to interim arrangements were shelved by the
mediators in part to avoid failure.  The question of religion and state remained unresolved.
The United States and the European Union praised Khartoum’s acceptance of self-
determination as a major step forward.  However, some observers saw the agreement on self-
determination as a small step in the right direction after years of stalled efforts.  The most
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contentious and difficult issues are yet to be tackled by IGAD mediators, including the
separation of religion from politics and interim arrangements prior to the referendum.  Some
observers believe that it is too soon to judge whether the concession on self-determination
represents a change in Khartoum’s position or a tactical move to buy more time.  A follow-
up meeting between the parties took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early August 1998.
The talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics.  The parties also
disagreed again on the territorial definition of southern Sudan for the purpose of referendum.
In February 2000, the parties met in Nairobi but failed to make progress.  In early June 2001,
former President Moi reconvened the stalled IGAD peace talks in Nairobi.  No progress was
made, according to a press release issued at the conclusion of the talks.  In January 2002,
IGAD mandated former President Moi to merge the IGAD peace process with the Egypt-
Libya Initiative (ELI), a peace initiative launched by the governments of Egypt and Libya in
2000.  A peace summit is expected to take place in mid-June 2002.
The Machakos Negotiations
On July 20, 2002, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,
after five weeks of talks in Machakos, Kenya, signed a Framework Agreement to end the war
in southern Sudan. The Machakos Protocol calls for a six-year transition period and a
referendum on the political future of southern Sudan at the end of the transition period. The
Agreement establishes an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of a final peace agreement. The Machakos Protocol also
exempts southern Sudan from the Islamic law or Sharia. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and Norway participated as observers in the Machakos IGAD negotiations. 
The Framework Agreement is seen by the mediators and Sudan observers as a major
breakthrough in the long-stalled IGAD peace process.  The government of Sudan had favored
the earlier Draft Agreement, which neglected self determination for the South and down-
played the separation of religion and the state.  The Framework Agreement by contrast gave
both sides something to take back to their constituencies.  The government of Sudan was able
to secure agreement that it can continue its Sharia laws in the North, while the SPLM/A was
able to secure clear agreement on a referendum to determine the political future of southern
Sudan, after a six-year transition period. The SPLM/A made important concessions at
Machakos, paving the way for the Framework Agreement.  The SPLM/A had long insisted
on a short transition period, two to four years.  The government had long insisted on a ten-
year transition period.  The SPLM/A accepted a longer transition period in order to give unity
a chance, according to members of the SPLM/A delegation at the talks.  The SPLM/A also
abandoned its long-standing opposition to Sharia by agreeing to the continuation of Sharia
laws in the North.  The government of Sudan’s acceptance of a referendum at the end of the
transition period was also seen as an important concession.
The second phase of the negotiations in late 2002 proved difficult. There were
significant disagreements on a wide range of issues.  The parties met to discuss the transition
period in mid-August 2002 and agreed to the following agenda: (1) Structure of Government:
Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Human Rights, and Judiciary and the Rule of Law; (2)
Security Arrangements; (3) Modalities for Implementing the Peace Agreement; (4) Regional
and International Guarantee.  The first two weeks were designed for briefings and lectures
by experts on a wide range of issues relating to nation building and conflict resolution.
Shortly after, the parties were given a 51-page report called “Draft Protocol on Power
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Sharing Within the Framework of a Broad based Transitional Government of National Unity
Between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM.”  The parties were asked to respond to
the mediators’ draft.
The government of Sudan and the SPLM delegations met in Karen, Kenya, in late
January-early February 2003 to discuss power- and wealth-sharing arrangements for the
Interim Period.  The parties reached agreement in principle on some aspects of power and
wealth sharing but remain far apart on a number of key issues.  In previous talks, the
negotiations were stalled because the parties could not agree on allocation of parliamentary
seats, civil service positions for Southern Sudanese, share of revenues from oil and other
resources, and power-sharing arrangements in the executive.  During the recent talks, the
parties agreed to move away from percentages and agreed on a formula of “equitable” power
and wealth sharing arrangements.  Although there appears to be broad understanding and
agreement about the formula, the prospects for misinterpretations are substantial.  The
mediators appear eager to reach agreements where possible and avoid contentious issues,
leaving unresolved issues for a later date.  The limited success on power and wealth sharing
issues hinges completely on the word “equitable” sharing of power and wealth.  The real
challenge is likely to come when the parties begin to discuss what “equitable” means to each
side.  The SPLM asserts that decades of neglect of and discrimination against  the South
should be compensated by giving Southerners more than what they have been offered in the
past.  The government of Sudan argues that other Sudanese communities also deserve
attention.
Current Developments
In late June 2004, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Sudan to assess
humanitarian and human rights conditions in Darfur, Sudan. Annan was scheduled to visit
three internally displaced persons (IDP) camps to make a first-hand assessment of the
situation in Darfur.  While at the Zam Zam camp in Northern Darfur, Annan was informed
of  human rights abuses committed by the Janjaweed, including rape, murder, and destruction
of African-Muslim villages.  At the  Meshtel camp, Annan  found the camp empty.  He was
later informed that the IDPs were forcefully removed to another. 
On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions
declaring the atrocities in Darfur genocide.  H.Con.Res. 467 called on the Bush
Administration to “continue to lead an international effort to prevent genocide in Darfur,
Sudan.”  S.Con.Res. 133 called on the Administration to “impose targeted means, including
visa bans and the freezing of assets, against officials and other individuals of the Government
of Sudan, as well as Janjaweed militia commanders, who are responsible for war crimes and
crimes against humanity in Darfur, Sudan.”
Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union expressed “grave concern at the
continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, western Sudan, where the lives of hundreds of
thousands civilians, who live in desperate conditions and require immediate life-saving
relief, are at great risk.”  The U.S.-EU declaration strongly condemned human rights
violations in Darfur. 
In late June 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Sudan to assess human rights
and humanitarian conditions in Darfur.  Powell is the highest U.S. official to visit Sudan in
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over two decades.  In Khartoum, the capital, Powell stated that the international community
“need[s] to see action promptly because people are dying and the death rate is going to go
up significantly over the next several months.”  United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan was also expected to visit Sudan to assess humanitarian conditions in Darfur.
A high-level U.S. delegation visited Khartoum in mid-February to discuss the IGAD-led
peace process.  Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Charlie Snyder, met with
senior Sudanese officials to encourage them to bring an end the two-year old peace process
as soon as possible.  The delegation also discussed the humanitarian situation in Darfur and
called on the government of Sudan to provide access to relief organizations  to deliver much-
needed humanitarian assistance.  U.S. Agency for International Development’s Assistant
Administrator, Roger Winter, visited Darfur and met with traditional and religious leaders.
According to press reports, some of the people who met Mr. Winter were later arrested by
security forces in Darfur.
In December 2003, President Bush called President Bashir of Sudan and Dr. John
Garang of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to encourage them to conclude
a just peace agreement and end the 20-year civil war.  In mid-December, Vice President
Osman Taha and Dr. Garang reportedly reached an agreement on wealth sharing.  The parties
agreed to split oil revenues equally during the Interim Period.  Meanwhile, in late November
2003, the SPLA sent a high-level delegation to Khartoum, the capital, for the first time since
the current conflict began in 1983.  The delegation was warmly received by both southerners
and northern students. 
The Humanitarian Crisis(South Sudan)
The current humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan is considered one of the worst in
decades.  According to the World Food Program (WFP), southern Sudanese “are facing
serious food and water shortages due to the combined disruptions of civil war and drought.”
(World Food Program website, [http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/index.asp?region=2].)
According to WFP, more than 2.9 million people in the south of the country are “severely
affected” by the civil war, and an estimated 800,000 people are affected by drought in the
north. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which is the U.N.-coordinated relief effort, was
established in 1989 in response to the death of 250,000 people due to starvation in southern
Sudan.  The OLS is a consortium of U.N. agencies and more than 40 non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that provides emergency relief for civilians living in drought and war-
affected areas. 
The 20-year civil war, drought, and raids by government-backed militias and rebel
groups have disrupted the distribution of food aid and obstructed assessments of need in
severely affected areas.  The crisis has escalated dramatically in recent years.  The scorched-
earth techniques used by pro-government militias have decimated fields and homes and
forced tens of thousands of  people to flee the war-torn areas. Many relief centers and
hunger-stricken areas are inaccessible by ground transportation because roads were
destroyed, did not exist or are impassible due to rain and mud. In February 2002, government
helicopter gunships bombed Bieh in Western Upper Nile, while civilians were lined up at a
food distribution center.  Seventeen people were killed and many more injured.
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U.S. Response.  The United States contributed more that $93.7 million in
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year (FY)2000, $154.7 million in FY2001, and $139.7
million in FY2002.  The United States has provided an estimated $162.9 million in
humanitarian assistance for FY2003. For 2004, the Administration is proposing a significant
increase in development assistance to Sudan, requesting $81 million, making Sudan the
largest recipient of bilateral assistance  in sub-Saharan Africa.  Moreover, the United States
is providing development aid in opposition-controlled areas to build the capacity of civil
administration, conflict resolution, and assist indigenous non-governmental organizations.
The Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program was initiated in 1999
with a budget of $2 million in FY1999 and is scheduled to continue through FY2003. The
budget for FY2003 is $9.5 million. In 2002, the Bush Administration also announced two
major development programs for southern Sudan and significantly increased the development
budget.  According to USAID, the Southern Sudan Agricultural Revitalization Project
provides $22.5 million for a five year program to improve agricultural production.  The
Sudan Basic Education Program is a five-year $20 million program designed to improve
access to quality education. 
Sudan and Terrorism
Sudan is considered a rogue state by the United States because of its support of
international terrorism, although in recent years it has taken some measures to improve its
record.  The State Department’s 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report said that Sudan
“has stepped up its counter terrorism cooperation with various U.S. agencies, and Sudanese
authorities have investigated and apprehended extremists suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities.”  According to the same report, “Sudan, however, remained a designated
state sponsor of terrorism.  A number of international terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda,
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’ al-Islmaiyya, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and HAMAS continued to use Sudan as safe haven, primarily for conducting logistics and
other support activities.” Counter-terrorism cooperation began in mid-2000, but the
government of Sudan did not offer significant assistance until after the September 11 terrorist
attacks.  In November 2001, President Bush renewed U.S. bilateral sanctions on Sudan and
the State Department kept Sudan on the terrorism list.
The United States placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism in August
1993 after an exhaustive interagency review and congressional pressure. Sudan has  been a
safe haven for major terrorist figures.  A particularly noteworthy example is Osama bin
Laden.  He used Sudan as a base of operations until mid-1996 when he returned to
Afghanistan, where he had previously been a major financier of Arab volunteers in the war
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  The government of Sudan claims that it
expelled bin Laden from Sudan due to pressures from the Middle East and the United States.
In August 1996, the State Department said that bin Laden was “one of the most significant
financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world today.”
On May 18, 2004, the State Department removed the government of Sudan from a list
of countries considered “noncooperative” in the war against terrorism.  State Department
spokesman Richard Boucher stated that “Sudan has taken a number of steps in cooperation
against terrorism over the past few years.” Secretary of State Colin Powell later declared that
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the U.S. will not normalize relations with the government of Sudan until the Darfur situation
is addressed.
Sudan and Oil Development
The government of Sudan earns an estimated $500 million annually from oil since it
began to export in August 1999.  Chevron  began oil exploration in the mid-1970s and made
its first discovery in1979.  Large reserves in the Upper Nile region of southern Sudan were
discovered in the 1980s.  Chevron interrupted its work several times in the mid- and late
1980s after attacks by the SPLA.  In 1990, Chevron halted operations and sold its
concessions to Arakis, a Canadian oil company.  Arakis was not able to raise the necessary
capital for its projects in Sudan, and due to company financial troubles, it was taken over by
another Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy.  In March 1997, Talisman Energy,
Petronas Carigali of Malaysia, PetroChina, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum
Company (CNPC), and Sudapet, Sudan’s national petroleum company, signed an agreement
and created a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) for oil
production and construction of a 1,000-mile pipeline.  PetroChina holds a 40% share,
Petronas 30%, Talisman Energy 25%, and Sudapet 5% in GNPOC. 
The government of Sudan and the oil companies involved in oil development have
come under severe criticism from human rights groups and NGOs.  Human rights groups
accuse the government of Sudan of a scorched-earth policy.  In a March 2001 report,
Christian Aid, a British-based NGO, declared that “in the oil fields of Sudan, civilians are
being killed and raped, their villages burnt to the ground.” (Christian Aid.  “The Scorched
Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, March 2001,” available on the Christian Aid website at
[http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0103suda/sudanoil.htm].)  The report blames
foreign companies for assisting the government of Sudan’s war effort by helping “build
Sudan’s oil industry, offering finance and technological expertise and supplies.”  According
to press reports and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government of Sudan has
doubled its military budget since it began exporting oil.  Some observers believe that because
of these new oil revenues, the government may not be interested in negotiating seriously to
end the war.
Members of Congress and Sudan advocacy groups have called on the Bush
Administration to impose capital market sanctions on companies involved in the oil industry
of Sudan.  The Sudan Peace Act, passed by the House in October 2000, contained a sense
of Congress language for such measures.  On April 26, 2001, Representative Payne
introduced H.Con.Res. 113 (for more see legislation section).  On June 5, 2001,
Representative Tom Tancredo introduced H.R. 2052, the Sudan Peace Act.  On June 13,
2001, the House amended and passed (422-2) H.R. 2052.  H.R. 2052 is similar to H.R. 931,
introduced in March by Representative Tancredo.  H.R. 2052 condemned the government
of Sudan, called for the appointment of a Special Envoy, and required foreign companies
doing business in Sudan to disclose their activities to the public if they seek access to U.S.
capital markets.  The amendment, which passed by voice vote, prohibited  companies
engaged in oil exploration and  production related activities in Sudan from “raising capital
in the United States.”  Companies are also prohibited from trading securities “in any capital
market in the United States.”  The Bush Administration opposed the disclosure as well as the
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capital market sanction provisions of the Sudan Peace Act.  (Washington Post, August 15,
2001)
Human rights groups and Sudan advocacy groups have launched a concerted campaign
to pressure oil companies involved in Sudan.  Since late 1999, a divestment campaign has
been underway targeting Talisman Energy.  As of April 2001, several U.S. institutions have
divested from Talisman Energy, including the State of New Jersey, the State of California
Public Employees Retirement System, the State of Texas Teachers Pension Plan, and the
State of Wisconsin (late April 2001).
Sudan:  Religious Persecution and Slavery
Of the estimated Sudanese population of more than 35 million, Sunni Muslims
comprise 70%; animists 25%; and Christians 5%. The NIF government in Khartoum views
itself as the protector of Islam in Sudan.  Political opponents are viewed as anti-Islam and
the civil war in southern Sudan is considered a jihad, or Holy War. For the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA), the war is to free southerners from political domination and
religious persecution. 
The NIF government’s practice of ‘holy war’ is reflected in attacks on civilians in the
south. Some attackers are wooed in part by the tradition that during a jihad they can keep
their booty. The result reportedly has been widespread institutionalized slavery and massive
dislocation. Captured slaves reportedly are forced to attend Quranic schools, change their
names, and sometimes indoctrinated to fight their own people. Through the government plan
of “forced acculturation,” thousands of children are abducted and forcibly converted to Islam
or face harsh beatings and torture.
Aerial bombardment of civilian targets has emerged as one of the most serious human
rights issues in U.S.-Sudanese relations.  In 2000, the government of Sudan bombed civilian
targets 167 times, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), a Washington-
based NGO.  In November 2000, the government dropped several bombs at a market in Yei,
killing an estimated 18 people and wounding dozens.  The State Department has condemned
such attacks by the government of Sudan on a number of occasions, but to no avail.  The
government claims that it is targeting the military bases of the SPLA and that the SPLA
deliberately surrounds its bases with civilians.  But human rights groups and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Sudan argue that the government is
destroying hospitals, schools, and feeding centers.  Media have reported that in February
2002, government helicopter gunships killed 17 civilians and wounded scores of people at
a U.N. feeding center in Bieh, Upper Nile province; that in May 2002, over a dozen people
were killed and over 50 wounded after government war planes dropped 16 bombs in Rier,
Upper Nile.
The United States and Sudan
Relations between the United States and Sudan continue to deteriorate because of
Khartoum’s human rights violations, its war policy in the south, and its support for
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international terrorism.  In 1967, Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the United States
because of American support for Israel in the Arab-Israel war. Relations were restored after
several months. In 1973, the U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission were
assassinated in Khartoum by members of the Black September group, who were tried and
sentenced to life imprisonment in Sudan.  Relations were further strained when Sudanese
President Nimeri commuted the sentences of the assassins. In response, Washington recalled
its new ambassador. In the mid-1970s, in the face of Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa
and the fall of Ethiopia into the Soviet sphere of influence, relations with the Nimeri regime
began to improve.  Nimeri’s support during Operation Moses, in which an estimated 7,000
Ethiopian Jews were airlifted to Israel through Sudan, further strengthened U.S.-Sudanese
relations, but later contributed to the ouster of Nimeri from power.  Relations became
strained once again when the democratically elected government of Sadiq el-Mahdi was
ousted in a military coup in 1989. Since the military takeover, human rights abuses by the
military junta have become a major source of tension between the two countries. The war in
the south has also been a thorny issue in U.S.-Sudanese relations.  
Another issue in U.S.-Sudanese relations is Sudan’s role in support of international
terrorism. Some Members of Congress have been instrumental in pushing a tougher Sudan
policy and played a key role in the decision to put Sudan on the list of states that sponsor
terrorism and to appoint a special envoy for Sudan. The State Department rejected
congressional calls for a special envoy in December 1993. The Department argued that a U.S.
special envoy would undermine regional and former President Carter’s peace efforts. In a
December 6, 1993 letter to Members of Congress, the Administration said the appointment
of a special envoy “would send the erroneous impression that the U.S. is becoming directly
involved, since Khartoum has made it clear that it rejects a role by the U.S. in the peace
process.”  However, persistent pressure by some Members of Congress led to a reversal of
State’s position in early 1994, at the insistence of the National Security Council (NSC) at the
White House.  The Clinton Administration appointed former Representative Harry Johnston
in late 1999.  The Bush Administration appointed former Senator John Danforth in
September 2001.
The Bush Administration and Current Policy Debate
In late 2000, Washington defeated efforts to lift United Nations sanctions on Sudan and
prevented Sudan from becoming Africa’s representative in the United Nations Security
Council.  Senior U.S. officials met with Sudanese government officials in 2000 to inform
Sudanese officials what it would take to improve relations.  U.S. security officials also spent
several months in Khartoum talking with Sudanese security officials on terrorism.  President
Bush has mentioned Sudan twice in his speeches in the last two months, condemning human
rights violations by the Bashir government. In early March 2001, Secretary of State Colin
Powell told members of the House International Relations Committee that Sudan is a priority
to him and the Administration.
Advocates of a tough U.S. policy towards the NIF government seem prominent in the
policy debate and appear to have the sympathy of senior Administration officials and
Members of Congress from both parties.  In mid-2001,  senior congressional leaders joined
Sudan advocates in condemning the government of Sudan and at a press conference on
Capitol Hill, Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX), Representative Charles Rangel (D-
NY), and the NAACP announced the formation of a bipartisan Sudan Caucus.  Advocates
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of a tough Sudan policy favor additional sanctions, appointment of a high-profile Special
Envoy, and active U.S. engagement in peace efforts.  They oppose the staffing of the U.S.
embassy in Sudan and some favor support for opposition forces.  These advocates would like
the United States government to take specific measures to address slavery and aerial
bombardment of civilian targets. Some who favor a policy of engagement argue that the
policy of containment and isolation has failed to produce tangible results and that the United
States itself is now isolated.  
A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that the
United States should focus on ending the war and engage the government of Sudan in
dialogue.1  The report argues that “in the past two years, Sudan’s rising oil production has
shifted the balance of military power in the government’s favor at the same time that
significant internal rifts have surfaced in Khartoum.”  The report contends that “in this fluid
context, the United States possesses significant leverage.  Among the major powers, it is the
lone holdout in renewing a dialogue with Khartoum.”  The authors of the report support the
full staffing of the U.S. embassy, a U.S.-supported peace process, and a “One Sudan, Two
Systems” formula to preserve the unity of the country.  The CSIS report drew fire from
Sudan activists and has triggered a sharp debate on U.S. policy toward Sudan.
The Clinton Administration and Sudan
In May 1996, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright,
reportedly called Sudan “a viper’s nest of terrorism.”  The United States closed its embassy
in Khartoum in February 1996 and moved the remaining embassy personnel to Nairobi
because of security concerns. Moreover, the U.S. government has imposed a series of
sanctions on the NIF regime over the years.  Washington suspended its assistance program
after the NIF-led coup in 1989, placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism in
August 1993, and supported United Nations Security Council sanctions on Sudan.  The
Clinton Administration expelled one Sudanese embassy official, who had been based in New
York, for suspected links to an alleged plot to bomb the United Nations.  (Goshko, John.
“Sudanese Envoy at U.N. Ordered to Leave U.S.” Washington Post, April 11, 1996. A17.)
Another Sudanese diplomat, who was a suspect in the plot, left for Sudan.  
On November 22, 1996, President Clinton announced the Administration’s decision to
ban senior Sudanese government officials from entering the United States as called for in
Security Council Resolution 1054.  On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security
Council lifted these sanctions.  The Administration actively supported allies in the region
affected by an NIF-sponsored destabilization campaign.  The United States has provided an
estimated $20 million in surplus U.S. military equipment to Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
The non-lethal military assistance such as uniforms and communications equipment to the
“frontline states” was intended to support them in fending off NIF’s campaign of
destabilization.  Observers interpret U.S. support to these countries as a measure to contain,
punish, and facilitate the downfall of the fundamentalist government in Khartoum. 
In November 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed comprehensive sanctions on
the NIF government after an exhaustive policy review. The sanctions restrict imports or
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exports from Sudan, financial transactions, and prohibit investments.  In making his case for
the sanctions, President Clinton stated that “the policies and actions of the government of
Sudan, including continued support for international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize
neighboring governments; the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and
the denial of religious freedom, constitute extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States.”  (Text of the executive order can be found at the U.S.




Called for an end to slavery and human rights abuses in Sudan.  Introduced April 10,
2003.  Passed House July 16, 2003.
H.Con.Res. 402(Tancredo)
Calls for an investigation of Sudanese officials involved in international terrorism.
Introduced March 30, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 403 (Wolf)
Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights in Darfur State.
Introduced April 1, 2004; passed House May 17, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 467 (Payne)
Declares the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan as genocide.  Introduced June 24,
2004; passed House July 22, 2004.
S. 2705 (Biden)
Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights and authorizes funds
in support of peace and for humanitarian purposes. Introduced July 21, 2004.
S. 2720 (Lugar)
Condemns the government of Sudan for violations of human rights in Darfur.
Authorizes $300 million, including $200 for Darfur.  Introduced July 22, 2004.
S.Con.Res. 133 (Brownback)
Declares genocide in Darfur, Sudan.  Introduced and passed Senate July 22, 2004.
S.Con Res. 137 (Frist)
Urges the United Nations to suspend Sudan from the United Nations Human Rights
Commission. Introduced September 15, passed same day.  Passed House September 22.
S. 2781 (Lugar)
Calls for comprehensive peace in Sudan, authorizes $300 million for humanitarian and
development purposes, and proposes sanctions.  Introduced September 9, passed with
amendments by Unanimous Consent.
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H.R. 5061 (Tancredo) 
Imposes sanctions on the government of Sudan, authorizes $450 million for
humanitarian and development purposes, and exempts opposition-controlled areas from
current sanctions. Introduced September 9, 2004.
